
# **OP BURNHAM**

**BDA** and current NZPRT analysis

Correct as at 261130DAUG10



## OP BURNHAM SUMMARY

#### Background:

In the early hours of 22 AUG, ANSF/CF conducted a partnered operation in TIRGIRAN to capture prominent TB leaders in confirmed TB compounds. These INS were directly involved in the 3 AUG KARIMAK attack.

Subsequent ISAF reporting from KABUL states that 13 INS were killed.

#### Casualties:

On the balance of much HUMINT reporting received by NZPRT, the following casualties are likely:

PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4(brother of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (father of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

(armed TB) In this list, names and other details that identify individuals have been redacted from this document for reasons of privacy and because some (armed TB) identifying informations may have been obtained by means that would

(armed TB) cause prejudice to protected interests if disclosed.

identified, the individuals identified in the list above appear to correlate However, and noting that some individuals have since been publicly with some of those who have been publicly identified.

> Four LN (2 x MAM in PEK Hospital) Wounded

Four additional bodies have been reported by NDS (NFI).

LN females (incl daughter of PSR(RN1, PSR(IC)4

## Current Disposn:

KALTA, NEMATULLAH and MIRAJ escaped.

KALTA is currently in TIRGIRAN. Armed LNs have gone to TIRGIRAN to pledge support for the TB. MIRAJ may be in ANADARAH after escaping from TIRGIRAN to N TWB.

**NEMATULLAH's location is unknown.** 

The remaining TB are continuing to move between the mosque in TIRGIRAN and tents in nearby valleys in DAHANE

ALLOWUDIN is distributing IED materials from TURMUSH.

#### ntent:

SHIKARI VY, DO-ABE and ISH PESHTA area are most probable target areas. Deliberate action during the elections is individualistic response, INS will meet over next few days to plan a complex attack to coincide with end of RAMAZAN. It is likely that TB will plan revenge attacks against ANSF/NZPRT targets. Unless there is an immediate (and rash) also probable

# CASUALTIES (based on NZ PRT HUMINT reporting)

## PROBABLY KILLED:

PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (F/O PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (B/O PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

(BOI)

LN Female(s)

TB fighter

TB linked: Likely to be PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

TB: Involved in 9 APR 10 KT2 atk

Unknown LN

Possibly PSR(R)1. PSR(IC)4 daughter?

## POSSIBLY KILLED:

Cousin of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4
PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

S/O PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (LN)

B/OPSR(R)1. PSR(IC)4

Nephew of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)\*

Relative of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

#### WOUNDED:

1×TB

2 x WIA MAM moved to POL-E KHUMRI

#### MISSING:

4 x LNs reported missing

### CONCLUSION

Reporting very confused.

- 3 x TB probably killed. 4 x TB possibly killed. Several LN killed.
- 1 x TB probably wounded. Several LN wounded.
- 4 x TB likely to be missing

Comd KALTA or PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 Either Maulawi NEMATULLAH or PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

Reportedly PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 Possibly B/O PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

Unknown

Maulawi NEMATULLAH or PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4


Unknown

Unknown Hrknown-b

Unknown-being investigated

Likely to be TB

In the list above, names and other details that identify individuals have been redacted from this document for reasons of privacy and because some identifying informations may have been obtained by means that would cause prejudice to protected interests if disclosed. However, and noting that some individuals have since been publicly identified, the individuals identified in the list above appear to correlate with some of those who have been publicly identified.



	Initial reports 13 x TB KIA	In the list above, names and other details that
	Information still not confirmed	identify individuals have been redacted from this
	NFI on potential detainees	document for reasons of privacy and because
		some identifying informations may have been
	NZPRT S2 ASSESSMENT:	obtained by means that would cause prejudice to
	4-5 x KIA (3 x low-level TB)	protected interests if disclosed.
	4 x WIA (1 x TB?)	However, and noting that some individuals have
	4 x MIA (4 x TB?)	since been publicly identified, the individuals
3		identified in the list above appear to correlate
		with some of those who have been publicly
		identified.

# Threat Considerations

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- Names of casualties do not match TB ORBAT from 3 AUG contact. This suggests that INS groups are likely to be intact.
- KALTA, NEMATULLAH and MIRAJ likely to be alive and considering options. NEMATULLAH may have lost support due to his absence at the funerals 24 and 25 AUG 10.
- ALLOWUDIN has resupplied INS with IED materiel from TURMUSH. Despite losing resources during operation (weapons, ammo, IED materiel), INS still possess sufficient resources to conduct several complex attacks.
- Numbers of low-level volunteer fighters may increase due to LN backlash. TB may infiltrate trained fighters from BAGHLAN, PARWAN or even PAK.
- LN funerals 24 and 25 AUG were recorded. TB swore on camera to retaliate against NZPRT and GIRoA officials.
- Some LNs in S TWB reported to support CF action. Most LN likely to at least tolerate TB presence. LNs in N TWB still broadly intolerant of TB. Exception is BARFAK-where ANP have an increased presence. LNs elsewhere in NE AO BAMYAN are supportive of CF action.
- TB group(s) assessed to still be IVO DAHANE NAYAK. Likely to be at nomadic (KUCHI) encampments and hills surrounding village. Likely to move every few days due to ongoing fear of CF airpower and 'spies'.
- Leaders likely to concentrate covertly to conduct planning for subsequent offensive action. Likely to be in an isolated ailag.
- NZPRT patrols and ANP CPs are reported to be the primary targets. Revenge is a strong motive.
- Auspicious dates during RAMAZAN include 27, 28, 29, 31 AUG and night 5/6 SEP 10.
- EID al-FITR (approx 10-13 SEP) may see family groups concentrate for festivities in home locs.
- Post-Eid period sees a few days before 18 SEP election. This may see sharp spike in violence.
- BAMYAN and TWB ANP appear to be more active: special task group has been estb. ANP keen to patrol SHIKARI. Increased presence in BARFAK
- Ongoing threat reports relate to AKF Bank in S SHIBAR and FPB ROMERO in MADR VY. These may offer 'interim targets' pending a large, retaliatory 'spectacular' event at end of RAMAZAN.

# TB Capabilities

- Despite losing resources during operation (weapons, ammo, IED materiel), INS still possess sufficient resources to conduct several complex attacks. IED materiel includes AT-mines, other mil grade munitions, access to HME and access to suitable CW and det systems.
- Sufficient manpower to allow INS to conduct several concurrent IED/RPG/SAF attacks.
- INS leaders possess good knowledge of the ground and may have sound surveillance/information networks to gain good SA of CF and ANP actys.
- Despite losing key safe-houses, INS retain safe areas in which to consolidate. These are likely to be in isolated ailags where a support network exists among local villagers and nomadic KUCHI
- A suicide capability is possible.

## **Broad ECOA**

No nothing – minimal response

Major retaliation – immediate response


BAU approach – normal tempo


Activate wider INS network


Rash 'revenge' response - aggrieved individual (suicide bomber)


Review situation, reconstitute, deliberate offensive plan


Combination of these COA











vovae1

